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TREATY OF VERSAILLES 



SPEECH 



OF 



HON. PHILANDER CHASE KNOX 

OF PENNSYLVANIA 



DELIVERED IN THE 



SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 



FRIDAY, AUGUST 29, 1919 



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WASHINGTON 
1919 

1347C8— 19802 




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SPEECH 

OF 

HON. PHILANDER OHASE KNOX. 



TREATY OF VERSAILLES. 

Mr. KNOX. Mr. President, I wish at the outset to make my 
own position perfectly clear, that reason or excuse for mis- 
understanding or misinterpretation may not exist. No one 
more abhors Germany's lawlessness, her cruelty, her gross 
inhumanity in the conduct of this war than do I. No one is 
more determined than I to make her pay the full penalty for 
the great wrongs she has inflicted on civilization and on the 
world whose equipoise she has by her iniquities well-nigh 
destroyed. It must not seem to be profitable for anyone to 
violate the great eternal laws, of right, and we must vindicate 
them now against Germany if we are to save ourselves from 
chaos. The observations I shall make are therefore dictated 
by no maudlin sympathy for Germany, the felon who must 
guffer the penalty incident to his crime. 

But I am vitally concerned in the peace of this world, and 
peace we must have if it be attainable. But, Mr. President, I 
am convinced after the most painstaking consideration that I 
can give, that this treaty does not spell peace but war — war 
more woeful and devastating than the one we have but now 
closed. The instrument before us is not the treaty but the 
truce of Versailles. It is for this body — the coordinate treaty- 
making power of this great neutral Nation of ours — to make of 
the document a peace treaty if possible, or if that be impos- 
sible, then we must put this Nation in such relation to the 
treaty and to the powers of the world that our voice may here- 
after as heretofore be always raised for peace. 

It is to be regretted that the whole matter has been so unfor- 
tunately managed, that there has been so much of needless 

134768—19802 3 



secrecy, so many times mere partial disclosure when the whole 
truth could and should have been told, so much of assumed 
mystery in the whole affair, that it has become impossible for 
any of us not in the confidences to tell when we have arrived at 
the whole of any matter/ It is no fault of mine if the facts 
themselves shall speak an impeachment of the wisdom, the pur- ' 
pose, or the result of the negotiations. 

Fortunately it is no longer necessary to insist upon the high 
importance of this treaty nor the fact that it marks the point in 
our history where we turn from our old course of proved happi- 
ness, prosperity, and safety to a new one, for us yet untried, of 1 
alliances, balance of power, and coalition with Countries and 
peoples whose interests, aspirations, and ideals are foreign to 
our own, because the people are waking to this as the true issue. 
Little by little they are bringing a divulgence of the facts con- 
nected with the treaty and they may now hope finally to see the 
whole of the great gaunt tragedy into Which those whom they 
had charged with protecting them were about to betray them. 

But as this treaty itself, as finally placed before us, is so in- 
tricate and all-embracing in its conception, is so ponderous and 
voluminous in its execution, is so microscopic in detail, and, 
because of these things, so inaccessible to the people upon whose 
backs it is proposed to place its mighty burdens, it has seemed 
due and proper that, to the extent of my power, I should add my 
bit to the information which other Senators are so ably placing 
before them. For assuredly it is one of the calamities of this 
situation that of the hundred million of us who are to sign this 
great promissory note, but a paltry few thousand will be able to 
read it before signature. And that, Mr. President, is at once 
my reason and my excuse for again intruding my voice in this 
discussion, for it is the duty of each of us who are charged with 
the responsibility of speaking and acting for the people in this 
matter to give to them in as concrete and understandable a form 
as we may the actual provisions of this document. The people 
will judge this matter rightly if they but know and understand 
its facts. 

But unfortunately this treaty, intricate, ponderous, and vol- 
uminous as it is, yet is by no means the whole story. Many 
134768—19802 



documents involved in its making are before neither the Senate 
nor the people. 

Within the last week the Committee on Foreign Relations re- 
quested that the proceedings of the peace conference and the 
documents connected therewith should be furnished for our 
information. The reply was that all were not here, only those 
immediately at hand having been brought, and that those here 
were being sorted and some would be finally sent to us. Why 
should these documents need sorting? Do they hold secrets it is 
thought best the American people should not know? 

Nor have we yet the treaties with Germany's allies— the former 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bulgaria, and Turkey— all of whom, 
if we may credit report, are to be dismembered or shorn of ter- 
ritory, or both. The provisions of the treaty before us are inti- 
mately and inevitably entwined with those of these other 
treaties. Can we wisely proceed without those treaties and 
treat this situation piecemeal? 

It was only this morning that the chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee handed me a most important treaty, which 
has already been completed and agreed upon— the treaty relat- 
ing to international air navigation— access to which he was only 
able to get through the British market at 9 pence per copy. 

If the negotiators found it necessary, as they did, to consider 
the whole situation at one time that they might arrive at har- 
monious arrangements, must not we also to act intelligently and 
wisely have everything before us? 

What is it, sir, about these things that the people can not 
know? What is there to hide from them? Must we take this 
thing, as the German people must take it, unsight and unseen? 
Are we to be no more advantaged than our fallen enemies? We 
are asking neither for a Saar Basin, a Fiume, nor a Shantung. 
We have no hope or desire of aggrandizement to be disappointed. 
We want merely to know what we are promising to do. 

Mr. President, a treaty of peace has two great functions : In 
the first place it ends the war and brings back peace ; and in the 
next place it gives to the victor his spoils which normally take 
the form of territorial adjustments and monetary or other in- 
demnity, either merely to make good his losses, or in addition 
134768—19802 



6 

to impose a penalty. If the victor be guided by a wise states- 
manship, he so accommodates his spoils as not to sow seeds 
for another conflict with his erstwhile enemy. The great war 
now ending was bottomed on Bismarck's violation of this funda- 
mental principle. France overlooked her indemnity, but she 
never forgot or forgave Alsace-Lorraine. There is, I warn you, 
Senators, many another Alsace-Lorraine in the treaty laid before 
us for action. 

The first of the named functions of a peace treaty is performed 
in this case not by an article specifically declaring that the 
treaty brings peace to the parties belligerent but by two widely 
separated clauses, one at the very beginning of the document 
and another at the very end of it, from which you spell out the 
time and occasion of the termination of this conflict. The initial 
clause, which follows the recitation of the persons signing, says ; 

From the coming into force of the present treaty the state of war 
will terminate. From that moment, and subject to the provisions of 
this treaty, official relations with Germany, and with any of the German 
States, will be resumed by the allied and associated powers. 

In the last article, the fourth and third clauses preceding the 

testimonial clause, read as follows : 

A first proces verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up 
as soon as the treaty has been ratified by Germany, on the one hand, 
and by three of the principal allied and associated powers, on the other 
hand. 

From the date of this first proces-verbal the treaty will come into force 
between the high contracting parties who have ratified it. For the deter- 
mination of all periods of time provided for in the present treaty this 
date will be the date of the coming into force of the treaty. 

Germany and Great Britain have already ratified the treaty. 
So soon therefore as the treaty has been ratified by any two of 
the remaining principal allied and associated powers, the re- 
maining powers being the United States, France, Italy, and 
Japan, and when the proces verbal of such deposit of ratifica- 
tions has been drawn up, " the state of war will terminate," as 
a reading of the many treaty clauses, coming into force at that 
time and making the further conduct of the war impossible, will 
clearly show. 

It results from the foregoing that in order to bring peace be- 
tween us and Germany it is not necessary that we shall ratify 
1347G8— 19802 



this treaty. It is true Congress need not accept this treaty 
termination of our belligerency, and might by proper resolution, 
either joint, concurrent, or by separate resolution to the same 
effect by the Senate and House, respectively, continue this war, 
because to Congress exclusively belongs the authority to create 
a status of war, and therefore it might continue such a status 
by a new declaration. But Congress has no desire to do and 
will not do this thing. 

On the other hand, Congress, while it can not negotiate a peace 
with the enemy, can nevertheless end hostilities with him by 
declaring as no longer existant the status of war with him, 
which the Congress created by its own act. 

Thus so soon as the first proces-verbal is drawn under this 
treaty, Congress may with all propriety, and should to insure 
full legality to the act of the Executive in negotiating this par- 
ticular treaty provision, pass a resolution— concurrent, because 
the Executive having already committed himself to the substance 
thereof, his approval would be superfluous— which shall declare 
that the status of war created by its resolution of April 6, 1917, 
no longer exists, and that a status of peace from that moment 
obtains. Thus we shall put the country immediately upon a com- 
plete peace basis and may at once resume all our normal com- 
mercial and other relations with Germany, unhampered by any 
restrictions. So much for that part of the treaty which ends 
the war. 

I pass now to the second branch of the treaty, which comprises 
its whole volume aside from the brief clauses I have quoted, and 
which deals with the victor's spoils. 

In order that we may better appraise the value of the pro- 
visions to which I shall call your attention it seems well that we 
recall the bearings of the course we laid for ourselves when we 
entered this war, when we literally pledged the lives of our 
own sons to the accomplishment of a purpose stated— a pledge 
redeemed in full necessary measure as the mourning in 50,000 
homes bears witness. To refresh our recollection of a few 
salient facts, I shall, in the first place, read the words of Presi- 
dent Wilson when he invited Congress to declare war. Said he, 
134768—19802 



8 

after adverting to the course of the Imperial German Govern- 
ment in submarine warfare: 

I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial 
German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the 
Government and people of the United States ; that it formally accept the: 
status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it ; and that it 
take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough 
state of defense but also to exert all its power, and employ all its re- 
sources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and 
end the war. 

A little later in the same address he said: 

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling 
toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon' their 
impulse that their Government acted in entering the war. It was not 
with their previous knowledge and approval. 

Still further on, asserting that Prussian autocracy — ■ 

has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of Govern- 
ment with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against 
our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our indus- 
tries, and our commerce — - 

He said : 

We knew that their source lay not in any hostile feeling or purpose 
of the German people toward us — who were no doubt as ignorant of them 
as we ourselves were — but only in the selfish designs of a Government 
that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. 

Again, still later : 

We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense 
about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for 
the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included ; for the rights 
of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to 
choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made 
safe for democracy. 

And finally he said : 

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in 
a high spirit of right and fairness, because we act without animus, not 
in enmity toward a people or with a desire to bring injury or disad- 
vantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible 
Government which has thrown aside all consideration of humanity and 
of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere 
friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the 
early reestablishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage be- 
tween us. 

Or, to put it shortly, our purposes as stated by Mr. Wilson were 
threefold — first, the defeat and elimination of the Imperial Ger- 
man Government and Prussian autocracy; next, the liberation 
from their yoke of despotism of the German people themselves — ■ 
for whom we had nothing but sympathy and friendship — to the 

134768—19802 



9 

end that they might be masters of their own fates and fortunes ; 
and, lastly, tlu reestablishment, as sincere friends of the German 
people, " of intimate relations of mutual advantage between them 
and us." 

But we here in Congress were not quite so sure-footed in our 
estimate of our relations to the German people in case we went 
to war. It became difficult for us to work out just how we could 
confine our hostility to the Imperial German Government when 
the German people and not the German royalty Avere to shoot 
down our sons, and while we were bending all our efforts to 
kill the German people. But we did see this in the situation : 
Our own citizens of German ancestry were among our best, most 
stalwart, and freedom-loving, patriotic citizens, whose ancestors 
in many cases had fled Germany to escape the despotism against 
which we were about to wage war. We recalled that the Teu- 
tonic peoples were in origin and early tradition a free people 
who knew no masters. And we judged that rid of those rulers 
who had debauched their intellects for generations this mighty 
people would reassert their racial characteristics as had their 
sons who had come to us, and that they would become in turn a 
great, free people, as they had been a great monarchical nation. 
And this is my faith to-day, if we but give that great people a 
fair chance, consistent with the punishment they have earned 
and must suffer. • 

But no one here Avas such an ecstatic as to conceive that, going 
forward, we should not make war on the German people, or 
that before the war should end we should not have engendered 
hostility toward them. Congress, therefore, on April 6 four 
days after the delivery of the President's address, declared in a 
joint resolution the existence of a state of war between the 
United States and the Imperial German Government, solemnly 
affirmed that the Imperial Government had so " committed re- 
peated acts of war against the Government and people of the 
United States " that a state of war has been thrust upon them by 
that Government, and therefore formally pledged the whole 
military and national resources of the country " to bring the 
conflict to a successful termination." 
134768— 19S02 



10 

These were the aims, the purix>ses, and the reasons for entry 
into the conflict as stated in our former record. How mighty 
was the accord of our whole people therein was shown by their 
full and quick approval of the measures Congress took to make 
good the pledge we gave— the passing of the selective service 
act and of the measures imposing our enormous financial powers 
and obligations. 

These were the ends and the purposes which threw into the 
conflict with their whole hearts and souls our great, splendid 
body of loyal citizens of German ancestry. Fired with the spirit 
of liberty and freedom and weighted with the blessings of free 
Government, they saw in the war an opportunity to bring to the 
home folk in the old fatherland the same inalienable rights of 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Their sons rushed to 
our standards to fight first that we might continue to live free 
and next that liberty and its blessings might come to their kin- 
dred across the sea. 

We did have, we had to have, a quarrel with the German peo- 
ple; it was inevitable that we should entertain toward them 
hostile feelings. But we had and have a sympathy for them as 
misguided and misdirected, and we did hope that winning the 
war we should liberate them from an intellectual despotism 
they seemed not to sense, and that thereafter they would arise a 
free, great people. 

So we entered the war. Eighteen months later Germany, stag- 
gering, asked for an armistice to arrange a peace. Before the 
armistice was granted the Emperor and the Crown Prince fled 
their dominions, followed by certain of their military chieftains. 
Next came the abdication of the Emperor and the initiation of 
proceedings looking to the democratization of Germany. 

Thus, prima facie, we had achieved the full purpose for 
which we entered the war; our enemy was defeated, the Im- 
perial Government destroyed, and the German people were 
liberated, free — again quoting the President — to " choose their 
way of life and of obedience." 

Following this came the signing of the armistice of November 
11, the terms of which wisely and properly put it beyond the 
power of Germany thereafter effectively to continue this war. 

1347Q8— 19S02 



11 

There we, who sought no territory, nor indemnity, nor ag- 
grandized power, should have rested, signed our peace when our 
associates made peace, and quit the war as we entered it, still 
free and independent, masters of our own destiny, able to work 
for the benefit of all mankind, unhampered by entangling alli- 
ances or commitments. 

We should have left the political adjustments and the in- 
demnities to the powers of Europe who alone were immediately 
concerned, we at most exercising a restraining hand to see, first, 
that justice was done to a fallen foe — and this in spite of the 
fact that he initiated and carried out the most cruel, relentless, 
inhuman war of modern times — and in the next place to insure 
that no more dragon's teeth were sown in Europe than the 
indispensable necessities imperatively required. Such a course 
would neither have endangered nor sacrificed those threatened 
peoples to whose assistance we came, for Germany had been dis- 
armed, and our two millions of young men, now for the first 
time fairly equipped, were still in France at the behest of any 
military exigency which might arise. 

But such was not the course followed, and our representa- 
tives sat at the peace table as coequal negotiators. 

Twenty-seven powers (besides Germany) have signed this 
treaty. Five of these— the United States, the British Empire, 
France, Italy, and Japan— are designated as the principal allied 
and associated powers. These 5 with the other 22 signing 
the treaty (besides Germany) are termed the allied and asso- 
ciated powers. Of these 22, 4 only were European powders 
in existence at the outbreak of the war, namely, Belgium, 
Greece, Portugal, and Roumania; three others of Europe are 
created or recognized by the treaty — Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the boundaries of which nor 
its location the treaty does not disclose. Of the remaining 
15 States, 3 are Asiatic— Siam, China — who has the sole dis- 
tinction of being robbed by her allies — and the Hedjaz — like- 
wise with undefined boundaries and, as to the treaty, unlocated. 
The 11 remaining States are of Latin-America as follows: 
Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama. Peru, and Uruguay. I have mentioned 
134768— 19S02 



12 

these 22 States so we may have clearly in mind the fact that 
all of them combined could not under the most favorable condi- 
tions one could hope for, withstand the armies of Germany 
one day, or enforce against Germany's will the most inoffensive 
treaty stipulation. In the domain of force, in which Germany 
has lived and will continue for a time to live, these powers 
count for naught. The great responsibilities of the treaty, the 
only power behind the treaty, is that of the five principal 
allied and associated powers. Nor does the treaty in any of 
its parts blink this. There is no single important function in 
the treaty, performable by the victor powers, which is not con- 
signed to the five great powers. There is no single important 
immediate function consigned to the league of nations which 
does not run to the council of the league which these five powers 
control and of which they are the sanctioning force. The 
small powers are named that may be granted benefits. The load 
of the world, the keeping of the peace of the world, under this 
treaty rests on the five powers. 

But there is one power we miss in all this, the power which 
met the brunt of the German shock while the rest of the world 
got ready ; the power that mobilized in the allied cause some 
21,000,000 men ; that lost— killed in action— 2,500,000 ; that lost 
in other casualties 3,500,000, of whom 1,500,000 are absolute in- 
valids and badly mutilated ; that lost in prisoners 2,000,000, of 
whom half died in prison ; a power whose armies at the beginning 
of February in 1917 numbered 14,000,000 men under arms ; who 
fought during the war over a front of 3,500 miles, and who had 
there pitted against her one-third of the whole German Army, 
two-thirds of the whole Austrian Army, all of the Hungarian 
Army, and two-thirds of the whole Turkish Army ; a power who 
took as prisoners of war 400,000 Germans, 300,000 Hungarians, 
300,000 Turks, and 1,000,000 Austrians. I speak of poor, ever 
despot-ridden Russia. I have but said China enjoyed a unique 
position ; but I spoke in haste. Russia, who raised three times 
as many men as we planned to raise as a maximum; Russia, 
whose losses if imposed on us would have made every home in 
this land a house of mourning ; Russia, whose men in battle front, 
unarmed and unequipped, stopped the German onrush of cold 
13476S— 19802 



13 

steel with bare breasts and clenched fists, so saving us an(5 Eu- 
rope from slavery ; Russia, whose people and rulers stood fore- 
front, our friends, even in the hours of our sore and most threat- 
ening distress ; this Russia, with this record, is mentioned in this 
treaty, but only with ominous words that presage her national 
destruction. 

Russia, sir, is a problem ; but dismemberment by others is not 
its solution. And shall I tell you, Mr. President, what the intelli- 
gent Russians, those of the great so-called middle classes, are 
saying? It is this : We must first recover ourselves and wipe out 
the dishonor of our collapse, the dishonor of forsaking our Allies 
in the hour of their dire need. And then we must readjust our 
dominions as we wish them, for Russia can never be bound by 
the Russia-disposing portions of a treaty to which Russia is not 
a party. And I ask you, sir, would we? 

And this thought brings me to speak again of what I have 
said heretofore, that this treaty, stripped of its meaningless 
beatific provisions, provides merely and simply for an alliance 
between the five great powers in a coalition against the balance 
of the world. And again I ask, has history ever answered this 
save in one way — by destroying the coalition and at times all or 
some of its constituent members? 

Think you Germany — smarting and staggering under the terms 
of this, the hardest treaty of modern times — will, even if we 
were to set up the league and she should join it, supinely rest 
content with the dole of grace and sufferance we are vouchsafing 
her, the crumbs from her victors' table? It is beside the point 
to say that such is but her just deserts and the full measure 
thereof. Lacking the wisdom to go forward and inflict a mili- 
tary punishment that would have uprooted their philosophy of 
force and taught them the lesson of live and let live, we have 
left them, beaten but proud and arrogant, with their mighty 
spirit bent for the time but unbroken, with their damning philoso- 
phy unchanged, and with a will, fired by hate, to- mete out re- 
venge. 

That people will no more cease to plot and plan to recover their 
former high estate than did Satan, plunged into the abysmal 
depths of Hell. Whether they are in the league if formed or out 

134768—19802 



14 

of it, Germany* agents, secretly or openly, will be at work with 
her former allies, and with injured Russia, and with Japan — 
whose conceptions, ideals, aspirations, and ambitions are Of 
Imperial Germany, not democratic America, Britain, and France. 
As Russia goes, so will go the whole Slavic and affiliated peoples. 
And if Germany succeed in this and be able to unite these powers 
to herself, to turn the teeming millions of Russia to swell her 
own ranks, and to augment this by the great yellow races of the 
Pacific, who, through Russia, would have unimpeded access to 
the battle front, western Europe, at least, must perish. Think 
you, Germany, revengeful, will turn aside from so imposing and 
grateful a vision in order to grace for generations a conqueror's 
triumph? 

Why have we invited this vision? Was there none at all of 
that much- vaunted forward-looking at the peace table? The 
wise, the obviously wise course required not months of inventing 
and piling up penalties, but a few hours devoted to a plan that 
should rid Germany of the Hohenzollerns, that should provide 
for her democratization, that should impose a lesson-bearing 
indemnity, and that should then bind with rivets of steel, be- 
cause rivets of friendship, the German people to western Europe, 
to France, who can not hope to keep Germany under her feet. 
Napoleon tried to conquer a people and failed — this should be 
France's lesson. The only possible wise course for France, her 
only permanent safety, is closest friendship with Germany. The 
restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, the payment of a suitable indem- 
nity, and then forgetfulness as the past, hard as that might 
prove — this should have sufficed. It may seem I am unsympa- 
thetic, unmindful, and forgetful of wrongs and injuries, un- 
moved by suffering and grief. I am none of these. I am trying 
to point out how France herself might escape further and more 
overwhelming wrong, suffering, and grief. For as certain as 
the sun rises, if we follow the road in which this treaty sets our 
feet, France and ourselves shall meet those on the way. 

The treaty of peace is divided into 15 parts. All of them deal 
with territorial adjustments, penalties, and indemnities of the 
war except Part I — containing the covenant of the league of 
nations — and Part XIII, labor — providing for an international 

134768—19802 



15 

labor organization. The other parts are, in their order : Part II, 
boundaries of Germany ; Part III, political clauses for Europe ; 
Part IV, German rights and interests outside Germany ; Part V, 
military, naval, and air clauses ; Part VI, prisoners of war and 
graves; Part VII, penalties; Part VIII, reparation; Part IX, 
financial clauses; Part X, economic clauses; Part XI, aerial 
navigation; Part XII, ports, waterways, and railways; Part 
XIV, guaranties ; and Part XV, miscellaneous provisions. 

It is of course impossible to give even a detailed summary of 
a volume of some eighty thousand odd words, doubtless the 
longest treaty in history. But I shall also aim to give a pic- 
ture of certain general features to which I wish to invite special 
attention. 

By this treaty Germany cedes outright portions of her Euro- 
pean territory to Belgium ; to France, a recession of Alsace- 
Lorraine; to Poland; to the Czecho-Slovak State; and to the 
principal allied and associated powers, including the United 
States, who get unconditionally Mem el — a small strip of terri- 
tory in the extreme northeastern tip of Germany — and the free 
city of Danzig with its adjacent territory, to be placed under the 
protection of the league of nations. Germany also cedes, con- 
tingent upon the wishes of the people in the area affected as ex- 
pressed by a vote, further portions of her territory to Belgium, 
to Poland, and to the allied and associated powers, who thus take 
Schleswig with an obligation at some time to hand it over to 
Denmark if the people so vote. The Czecho-Slovak State se- 
cures a further bit of territory if a determination of the Polish 
frontier should isolate it from Germany; and the league of 
nations takes as trustee the Saar Basin, which shall be governed, 
however, by a commission appointed, not by the league but by 
the council of the league, pending the plebiscite of 15 years 
hence. Thus the United States becomes the owner in fee of a 
tenant in common of European territory and a trustee as to 
other territory. 

For this territory so ceded nobody pays Germany anything, 

nor is any credit allowed Germany for it on her reparation 

account, to which I shall shortly refer. However, all cessionary 

powers, except France and the league of nations as to the 

134768—19802 



16 

Saar Basin, assume that portion of the imperial and State 
debt attaching to the ceded area — fixed, stated roughly, upon 
the basis of the prewar revenue of the area to the prewar 
total imperial and State revenue, respectively. 

The imperial and State property in all these areas, including 
the private property of the former German Emperor and other 
royal personages, is turned over to the cessionary of the area, 
who must pay the value of the same to reparation commission, 
which places the same to the credit of Germany on the repara- 
tion account. This does not apply to France, who takes such 
property in Alsace-Lorraine without payment, nor to Belgium, 
nor to the Saar Basin. 

Germany cedes all her overseas possessions in fee simple to 
the allied and associated powers, who do not assume the 
debts and who take all the property, without any compensation 
whatever running to Germany, either for the territory ceded 
or for the actual property taken. Thus the United States 
becomes a tenant in common with the British Empire, France, - 
Italy, and Japan, of Germany's African possessions, compris- 
ing Togo, Kamerun, German Southwest Africa, and German 
East Africa, with an area of nearly 1,000,000 square miles — 
almost one-third the size of the United States — and a native 
population of about eleven and a half millions ; of her Pacific 
possessions, including Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, Bismarck's Archi- 
pelago, Carolina Island, Palau or Pelew Islands, Marianne 
Islands, Solomon Islands, and Marshall Islands. It may be 
noted in passing that certain of these island possessions form 
a barrier ring to access to the Philippines, and their possession 
by any other power other than ourselves is big with potential 
troubles for us. 

Germany cedes also, without compensation of any sort or de- 
scription, her extraterritorial and analogous rights in Siam, 
Morocco, Egypt, and Samoa, and recognizes the French pro- 
tectorate in Morocco and the British protectorate in Egypt. The 
imperial and State property in these areas go to the cessionaries 
without compensation. The same is true of such property 
located in and ceded to China. Germany's rights in Shantung 
134708—19802 



17 

and German property also are ceded to Japan " free and clear 
of air charges and encumbrances." 

Thus territorially Germany has been closed out in all the 
world without a penny's compensation. Moreover, she loses the 
efforts of a generation to provide an outlet for her rapidly 
increasing surplus population, which now must and will find 
expanding room elsewhere. To this situation is added a re- 
striction of Germany's European area, which would have taken 
care of a part of this expansion. ■ . 

The indemnities provided by the treaty may be classed roughly 
into two divisions: (1) Restitution in cash of cash taken away, 
seized, or sequestrated, and also restitution of animals, objects 
of every nature, and securities taken away, seized, or seques- 
trated in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them 
in territory belonging to Germany or to her allies; and (2) 
reparation for all the damage done to the civilian population 
of the allied and associated powers and to their property during 
the period of the belligerency of each as an allied or associated 
power against Germany by her aggression by land, by sea, and 
from the air, and this includes damages inflicted not only by 
Germany but by Germany's allies, and also by the allied and 
associated powers themselves upon their own nationals. 

There can, of course, be no question as to the propriety of com- 
pelling Germany to disgorge the loot which she seized and which 
she still has, nor in requiring her to replace that which she 
seized and has since consumed or otherwise used or destroyed. 
No matter what this may mean to Germany, no matter how it 
may leave her, this must be done. The thief must not be heard 
to plead necessity for the article he stole nor inconvenience from 
restoring it. This is the most elemental justice and the whole- 
somest morality. Thus far we move on solid ground. 

But when we get away from and go beyond this, it behooves 
ns to proceed with care, lest we go beyond the bounds of 
wise statesmanship and, in the homely adage, kill the goose that 
we expect to lay the golden eggs. 

But the treaty edges in on the perfectly proper theory of 
restitution by a theory designated as replacement, which places 
Germany under rather startling obligations. She is first made 
i::4T0S— 19802 2 



18 

to "recognize (s) the right of the allied and associated powers 
to the replacement, ton for ton (gross tonnage) and class for 
class, of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged 
owing to the war." She then acknowledges " that the tonnage 
of German shipping at present in existence is much less than 
that lost by the allied and associated powers in consequence of 
the German aggression," and agrees that " the right thus rec- 
ognized will be enforced on German ships and boats under the 
following conditions " : Germany cedes to the allied and asso- 
ciated powers, on behalf of herself and of all other parties in- 
terested, all German merchant ships which are of 1,600 tons gross 
and upward. Included in these will doubtless be the 32 aux- 
iliary cruisers and fleet auxiliary — named in another part of 
the treaty — which are to be disarmed and treated as merchant 
ships. In addition to the foregoing, Germany further cedes 
one-half, reckoned in tonnage, of the ships which are between 
1,000 tons and 1,600 tons gross ; one-quarter, reckoned in ton- 
nage, of the steam trawlers ; and one-quarter, reckoned in ton- 
nage, of the other fishing boats. All the foregoing must be de- 
livered to the reparation commission within two months of the 
coming into force of the present treaty. 

Thus, we take practically all of Germany's means of conduct- 
ing commerce through her own vessels with overseas countries, 
of whom we are the farthest away and of which we shall stand 
most in need, for it is an open secret that before the war the 
German shipping was the peer at least of any shipping in the 
world. 

But the treaty goes further than this and compels Germany to 
lay down in her own shipyards a maximum of 200,000 tons of 
shipping for each of the next five years — approximately half, I 
am told, of her shipbuilding capacity — and our representatives, 
the reparation commission, determine the specifications, con- 
ditions of building, price to be paid — by giving credit against 
the reparation bill the commission will make up — and all other 
questions relating to the accounting, building, and delivery of 
the ships. 

Thus, for a number of years at least, we have pretty effectively 
barred German vessels from the seas. 

134768—19802 



19 

But this is only half the story. She is also in good part 
stripped of her inland shipping, for by this treaty she very 
property undertakes to restore in kind and in normal condition of 
upkeep to the allied and associated powers any boats and other 
•movable appliances belonging to inland navigation which since 
August 1, 1914, have by any means whatever come into her pos- 
session or into the possession of her nationals, and which can be 
identified. This would, of course, cover boats purchased by 
Germans for full value, transactions that might have been car- 
ried out through neutrals. 

Nor is this all. With a view to making good the loss of the 
allied and associated powers in inland-navigation tonnage which 
can not be made good by the restitution already recited, Ger- 
many agrees to cede to the reparation commission a portion 
of her river fleet up to the amount of the loss mentioned to a 
maximum extent of 20 per cent of the river fleet as it existed 
November 11, 1918. 

As to all the foregoing ocean-going and inland-navigation 
vessels, Germany agrees to take any measures indicated to her 
by the reparation commission for obtaining the full title to the 
property in all ships which have during the war been trans- 
ferred, or are in process of transfer, to neutral flags without 
the consent of the allied and associated Governments. 

Nor is this all. She waives all claims against the allied or 
associated powers for the detention, employment, loss, or dam- 
age of any German ships, except as called for by the armistice 
agreement ; all claims to vessels or cargoes sunk by naval action, 
and subsequently salved, in which the nationals of the allied 
and associated powers or the powers themselves may be interested 
either as owners, charterers, insurers, or otherwise, notwith- 
standing any decree of condemnation which may have been 
made by a prize court of Germany or her allies. 

But I am compelled to note still further shipping deliveries. 
The treaty obliges Germany to cede to France tugs and vessels 
from among those remaining registered in German Bhine ports — 
after the above deductions — to an amount fixed not by the 
treaty even in maximum but by an arbitrator appointed by the 
United States. The tugs and vessels so taken must have with 
13476S— 19802 



20 

them their fittings and gear, shall be in a -good state of repair 
to carry^on traffic, and shall be selected from among those most 
recently built. 

Similarly and under like conditions, tugs and vessels to aa 
unnamed amount must be transferred to the allied and asso- 
ciated powers from those used on the river systems of the Elbe, 
the Oder, the Niemen, and the Danube ; and, in addition, Ger- 
many must cede material of all kinds necessary for the utiliza- 
tion of these river systems by the allied and associated powers 
concerned, 

France also gets all installations, berthing and anchorage 
accommodations, platforms, docks, warehouses, plants, and so 
forth, which German subjects or German companies owned on 
August 1, 1934, in Rotterdam, and the shares or interests pos- 
sessed by such nationals or companies therein. 

Thus seemingly under a theory of replacement the treaty 
likewise strips Germany of much of her inland shipping. 

The effect of all this upon Germany's future and upon her 
ability to meet the other requirements of this treaty are well 
worthy of deep and mature reflection. 

But drastic and possibly ruinous as all this is, it yet is but 
the beginning. 

The next inroad on the doctrine of restitution is made under 
the name of physical restoration. Germany undertakes to 
devote her economic resources directly to the physical restora- 
tion of the invaded areas of the allied and associated powers to 
the extent that these powers may determine. Under this pro- 
vision the allied and associated governments may list the ani- 
mals, machinery, equipment, tools, and like articles of a com- 
mercial character, which have been seized, consumed, or de- 
stroyed by Germany or destroyed in direct consequence of mili- 
tary operations — this would include military operations by 
the allied and associated powers themselves — which such 
powers urgently and immediately need and which they desire 
to have replaced by animals and articles of the same nature, 
in being in Germany at the coming into force of this treaty. 
As an immediate advance of animals on this account. Ger- 
many must within three months deliver to France 30,500 
134768—19802 



21 

horses, 92,000 cattle, 101,000 sheep, and 10,000 goats ; and to Bel- 
gium 10,200 horses, 92,000 cattle, 20,200 sheep, and 15,000 sows. 
As to such animals, machinery, equipment, tools, and like articles 
of a commercial character, the reparation commission in decid- 
ing the amount which shall ultimately be given by Germany must 
take into consideration German's needs, having in mind the 
maintenance of German's social and economic life and the gen- 
eral interest of the allied and associated powers that the indus- 
trial life of Germany shall not be so impaired as adversely to 
affect Germany's ability to perform the other acts of reparation 
called for. It is, however, provided that of machinery, tools, 
equipment, and like commercial articles a maximum of 30 per 
cent may be taken of the quantity actually in use in any one 
establishment. 

Similar lists, subject to the same regulations may be made by 
the allied and associated powers of reconstruction materials — 
stones, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, wood, window glass, 
steel, lime, cement, and so forth — machinery, heating appara- 
tus, and like commercial articles which the powers may desire 
to have produced in Germany. 

In addition to the foregoing and of like character is the obli- 
gation of Germany to furnish coal to France at France's op- 
tion, up to a maximum of 20,000,000 tons for each of the first 
five years and 8,000,000 tons for any one of the succeeding 
five years ; to Belgium, at her option, 8,000,000 tons per year for 
10 years ; to Italy, at her option, amounts beginning at 4,500,000 
tons for the first year and increasing to 8,500,000 tons for the 
last six years ; and to Luxembourg, her annual prewar supply, if 
the reparation commission so directs ; a possible total of 32,- 
000,000 to 35,000,000 tons for the first five years and of 25,- 
000,000 tons for the next five years. At the option of the 
vendees, metallurgical coke instead of coal must be deliv- 
ered at fixed ratios. In this category also is to be placed the 
German obligation to deliver to France for the next three succes- 
sive years some 115,000 tons of coal distillation products, and 
to the reparation commission 50 per cent of the total dye stuffs 
and chemical drugs in Germany or under German control at the 
date of the coming into force of the present treaty. 
134768—19802 



22 

In considering the question of supplying coal we must not 
lose sight of the cession of the Saar Basin coal mines to 
France. 

But we come now to an item which is not to be accounted 
for as restitution, as replacement, or physical restoration. I 
refer to the cession by Germany on her own behalf and on be- 
half of her nationals of her submarine cables. By this act the 
treaty takes from Germany all direct telegraph relations with 
overseas countries. 

As a final entry under this general head I wish to observe 
that, speaking generally, Germany also cedes to the States 
which secure portions of her territory all railways situated 
therein, and I find in the treaty no positive provision for the 
payment therefor by anyone. This cession carries with it 
the works and installations; the rolling stock, complete where 
a ceded road has its own stock, in a normal state of upkeep, 
and where a ceded road has no rolling stock of its own, then 
rolling stock from German lines with which the ceded por- 
tion forms a system; and stocks of stores, fittings, and plants. 
And while on this point I may add that Germany must build 
for Czechoslovakia a designated railroad if that State so 
elects, at the latter's cost, and must build for Belgium the 
German portion of a deep-draft Rhine-Meuse navigable water- 
way at her own cost, seemingly, if Belgium decides the canal 
should be built. 

Now, as to the bill against Germany. Germany is made to 
admit as a basis of her liability, the responsibility for herself, 
and for all her allies, for causing all the loss and damage to 
which the allied and associated Governments and their na- 
tionals have been subjected as a consequence of the war. 

The allied and associated powers, recognizing the burden 
thus stated is too heavy for German resources to bear " after 
taking into account permanent diminution of such resources 
which will result from other provisions of the present treaty," 
require, and she so undertakes, that Germany make compen- 
sation for all damage done to the civilian population of the 
allied and associated powers and to their property during the 
184768—19802 



23 

period of belligerency of each as an allied or associated power, 
by land, by sea, and by air. 

The reparation commission is to find one bill against Ger- 
many for this damage, the elements of which are of such im- 
portance that I feel I ought to cover them in some detail. 
They are as follows: 1. Damage to injured persons and to 
surviving dependents by personal injury to or death of civilians 
caused by acts of war, including all attacks on land, on sea, 
or in the air, and all the direct consequences thereof, and of 
all operations of war by the two groups of belligerents wherever 
arising. 2. Damage to civilian persons, caused by Germany or 
her allies, by acts of cruelty, violence, or maltreatment — in- 
cluding injuries to life or health as a consequence of im- 
prisonment, deportation, internment, or evacuation, of exposure 
at sea or of being forced to labor— wherever arising, and to the 
surviving dependents of such victims. 8. Damage to civilian 
persons injured either in German territory or invaded terri- 
tory, caused by Germany or her allies by acts injurious to health 
or capacity to work or to honor, as well as to their surviving 
dependents. 4. Damage caused by any kind of maltreatment 
of prisoners of war. 5. As damages, the pensions and com- 
pensations in the nature of pensions to naval and military — 
including members of the air force — victims, whether muti- 
lated, wounded, sick or invalided, and to the dependents of 
such victims, sums so due to be capitalized on the basis of 
the French scale in force on the coming into effect of the pres- 
ent treaty. 6. The cost of assistance extended to prisoners of 
war and their families. 7. Allowances by the Governments of 
the Allies and associated powers to the families and depend- 
ents of mobilized persons or persons serving in the forces, the 
sum to be paid to be capitalized on the basis of the French 
scale in force during the year the payment was made. 8. 
Damage to civilians by being forced by Germany or her allies 
to work without just remuneration. 9. Damage to all prop- 
erty, wherever situated belonging to any of the allied or as- 
sociated States or their nationals, with the exception of naval 
or military works or materials, which has been carried off, 
seized, injured, or destroyed by the acts of Germany or her 

134768—19802 



24: 

allies on land, on sea, or from the air, or damages directly in 
consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war. 10. 
Damages in the form of levies, fines, and other similar exac- 
tions imposed by Germany or her allies upon the civil popula- 
tion. 

It is admitted that certain of these damage rules violate the 
principles of international law as hitherto recognized and ob- 
served by the family of nations. The reason why we as well as 
the enemy should discard such benign principles as have been 
worked out by the nations in the last centuries is not clear. 

The thought has been entertained that the treaty fixes, at 
least tentatively, the German indemnity under these rules at 
120,000,000,000 gold marks, about $24,000,000,000, but such an 
idea is not justified. 

In the first place, Germany agrees, in addition to the sum 
named, to pay Belgium's debt to the Allies and associated powers, 
whatever the debt may be. This payment is to be considered 
restoration. 

In the next place, the treaty stipulates that the $24,000,000,000 
worth of gold bonds which Germany undertakes to issue is to 
cover " whatever part of the full amount of the approved claims 
is not paid in gold, or in ships, securities, and commodities, or 
otherwise." Thus the total values of all the materials to be 
turned over as heretofore mentioned seem quite clearly to be in 
addition to this 24,000,000,000 of gold bonds. 

Moreover, it is provided that " further issues [of bonds] by 
way of acknowledgment and security may be required as the 
[reparation] commission subsequently determined from time 
to time." 

So that the bill against Germany will clearly not stop at 
$24,000,000,000 and may run to any amount. 

I may here also correct another impression that has gone 
out, namely, that somehow the reparation commission can re- 
duce the amounts to be paid by Germany, if they decide such a 
course is wise and just. Now, the reparation commission is 
made up of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, 
France, and Italy, who always sit at its sessions, and the repre- 
sentatives of one other power, either Belgium, Japan, or the 
13476S— 19S02 



25 

Serb-Croat-Slovene State. While each other allied and asso-. 
ciated power may have a representative present when its. in-, 
terests are. .involved, such representative may not vote. . This 
commission decides the amount of the claims against Germany 
by a majority vote — that is to say, the representatives of Great 
Britain, France, and Italy, or Belgium, or Japan, or the Serb- 
Croat-Slovene State, any three of them — may fix the amount of 
this indemnity. But a decision to cancel the whole or any part 
of the German debt or obligation requires a unanimous vote of 
all of them sitting, and before this decision can become operative 
the commission must have the specific authority of the several 
Governments represented on the commission. In other words, 
unless the four great powers and Belgium or Japan or the 
Serb-Croat-Slovene State unanimously so agree, the claims once 
fixed by a majority of the commission can not be abated one 
penny, except by the consent of all the powers represented on 
the coniuiission. Moreover, the commission is closely limited 
even as to the postponement of total or partial reparation pay- 
ments, for all such postponements beyond 1930 of payments 
falling due between May 1, 1921, and the end of 1926, and of any 
postponement, for more than three years, of any installment 
falling due after 1926 requires a unanimous vote. 

Assuming, for the sake of the argument, that some one of the 
powers represented on the commission is determined to exact 
the pound of flesh, there is no way under this treaty to prevent 
it, short of the application of coercive measures. The reparation 
commission is not and is not intended to be a beneficent philan- 
thropic or eleemosynary institution; it is and must be the en- 
forcer of stern retribution, imposing on the vanquished the 
utmost burden his back will bear. 

But these measures are by no means the end of the story. 

Reference has already been made to the payment by Germany in 

securities of what I shall designate her nonbond debt. On 

this point I quote from the treaty : 

Germany will within six months from the coming into force of the 
present treaty deliver to each allied and associated power all securi- 
ties, certificates, deeds, or other documents of title held by its nationals 
and relating to property, rights, or interests situated in the territory of 
that allied or associated power, including any shares, stock, debentures, 
134768—19802 



26 

debenture stock, or other obligations of any company incorporated in 
accordance with the laws of that power. 

That is to say, German investments in allied or associated 
countries and held in Germany are to be wholly closed out. 

Moreover, all other property held by Germans or German 
companies in allied or associated countries, or territories, colo- 
nies, possessions, and protectorates, may be retained or liqui- 
dated by such powers. This completes the closing out of 
German interests in allied and associated countries. Nor is this 
all, for this last provision applies to territories ceded to the 
allied and associated powers by this treaty, so that Poland, 
Czecho-Slovakia, the free city of Danzig, the principal allied 
and associated powers in Memel, Denmark, Belgium, and 
France may sell out property and interest of every German 
national or company within their newly acquired territory. 

Furthermore, the separation commission may require, by a 
majority vote, the German Government to acquire and turn 
over to it the rights and interests of German nationals in any 
public utility or concession operating in Russia, China, Turkey, 
Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or in the possessions or de- 
pendencies of these States, or in any territory formerly belong- 
ing to Germany or her allies, or to be administered by a 
mandatory under this treaty. 

Nor is this the end. Germany must fully compensate, and 
most properly so, the nationals of all allied and associated 
powers for the losses they have suffered with reference to 
property located in German territory, and this includes all 
property acquired or in course of acquisition by the German 
alien property custodian, this compensation to be reduced by 
the actual value of any property restored to the owners. 

For all property rights or interests taken by the allied and 
associated powers from German nationals, Germany undertakes 
to compensate them. 

Now the disposition of the proceeds of all this German prop- 
erty is obviously of the utmost importance. The treaty pro- 
poses two methods, one of which is so fantastic that it is 
difficult to believe our wildest dreamer would, on study, care 
to adopt it. I shall give you the effect of a few of its salient 

134768—19802 



27 

features: If we should proceed under it, the United States 
would guarantee the payment of all specified debts owed by 
our citizens — who were solvent at the beginning of the war- 
to Germans. We would establish a clearing office which would 
take over all such debts due to our citizens from Germans, and 
we would undertake to act as a collection agent for all such 
debts due from our citizens to Germans, making good any we 
did not collect. From the coming into force of this treaty all 
payments or acceptance of payments and all communications 
regarding the settlement of specified obligations would be 
absolutely prohibited between our citizens and Germans, under 
penalties imposed for trading with the enemy, except corre- 
spondence through our clearing office, and each Government 
would promise to do its utmost to ferret out and report viola- 
tions of the prohibitions to the others. 

If an American citizen made a claim which was not allowed, 
he would be fined. If he contested a claim which was allowed, 
he would be fined. Where he and the German could not agree, 
the two clearing offices would settle it if they could; if they 
could not agree, it would go to the mixed arbitral tribunal. If, 
finally, a debt were held either by the clearing offices or the 
mixed tribunal not to be within the specified classes, permis- 
sion is graciously given to the parties to go to court. 

When all such debts are liquidated any credit balance in 
favor of Germany goes to the reparation commission to be 
credited on Germany's account. That is to say, the excess 
proceeds of German property in the United States would go 
to compensate Italian or Greek or some other power's losses. 

If this clearing-office system be. not adopted, then Germany 
pays directly to the allied and associated Governments, or 
their interested nationals, the cash assets and the proceeds of 
the property, rights, and interests in her hands belonging to 
them; but each of the allied and associated powers shall dis- 
pose of the proceeds of the property rights and interests and 
of the cash assets of German nationals in accordance with its 
laws and regulations. They may apply them if they wish to 
the payment of claims and debts held by their nationals 
against German nationals, including claims against the German 
134768—19802 



28 

Government for acts committed by it after July 31, 1914, and 
before the particular power concerned entered the war against 
Germany. Or, and this is most remarkable, the power may 
use this money derived from the proceeds of property owned 
by German nationals to pay debts due the power's nationals 
from nationals of German allies. That is, we may use German 
money to pay a Turk's debt. 

And in all of this it is well to remember that by the treaty 
the property rights and interests of German nationals will con- 
tinue to be subject to exceptional war measures that have been 
or will be taken against them. 

It had not been and is not my purpose to attempt a discussion 
of the number of provisions of this instrument which run 
counter to our constitutional guaranties, but I can not forbear 
the observation that no one will, I apprehend, be so hardy as 
to contend that, peace being established, we shall continue to 
have power to take private property without compensation. 

Under this plan also the excess of German property over 
American debts will go to the reparation commission, if we 
retain the excess. The treaty is not clear as to any other dis- 
position of the surplus. 

Now, for all this German property so disposed of, and for 
which Germany assumes liability to her own nationals, no credit 
is given on the reparation account, save as to that part which 
may be ultimately turned over to the reparation commission. 

One point more and I shall be done with this part of the 
treaty. It is stipulated that all investments, wheresoever 
affected with the cash assets of nationals of the high contract- 
ing parties, including companies and associations in which 
such nationals were interested, by persons responsible for the 
administration of enemy properties or having control over such 
administration, or by order of such persons, or of any authority 
whatsoever, shall be annulled. That is to say, either the treaty 
annuls or we obligate ourselves to annul all investments by 
our Alien Property Custodian of enemy funds. The disposition 
of such funds is not clear. 

Thus we close out German interests in all allied and asso- 
ciated countries. 
134768—19802 



29 

But we also take other commercial measures no less far- 
reaching. The treaty terminates all multilateral treaties to 
which Germany is a, part except those specifically named in the, 
instrument, and all bilateral treaties and conventions between 
her and, other powers save only those which the other powers 
notify their intention to reyive. Thus another presumed tenet 
of international law passes out with this treaty. 

Moreover, under this treaty the allied and associated powers 
acquire all the treaty and conventional rights and advantages 
enjoyed by Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, and such 
rights and advantages granted to and enjoyed by nonbelligerent 
States. or their nationals since August 1, 1914, so long as such 
treaties, conventions, or agreements remain in ■force. Thus no 
power having with Germany a treaty which gave to Germany a 
favored position at the expense of the power will revive such ■ 
a treaty, and every power having a treaty which gives her an 
advantage over Germany will revive that treaty. Furthermore, 
if Germany shall undertake to make with any foreign country 
any reciprocity treaty in regard to the importation, exporta- 
tion, or transit of any goods, then all favors, immunities, and 
privileges granted by it shall simultaneously and unconditionally 
and without request or compensation be extended to all the 
allied and associated States. The treaty thus effectually pre- 
vents Germany from fostering her commerce by special trade 
agreements with other countries. 

The tariff and customs provisions are equally drastic. Not- 
withstanding the increased costs of production throughout the 
world, Germany may not, for the first six months after the 
coming into force of this treaty, impose higher tariffs than the 
most favorable duties applied to imports into Germany on July 
31, 1914; and for a period of 30 months thereafter the same 
rule shall apply to all imports covered by a designated schedule 
which enjoyed rates conventionalized by treaties, to which im- 
ports are added other named articles. 

Furthermore, as to all duties, charges, prohibitions, and re- 
strictions on both exports and imports, the allied and associated 
powers enjoy favored-nation treatment. I shall make no at- 
134768—19802 



30 

tempt even to list the exceptional tariff privileges granted to 
France, to Poland, to Luxemburg, to Morocco, and to Egypt. 

The nationals of allied and associated powers resident in Ger- 
many have as to all measures relating to occupation, profes- 
sions, trade, and industry most-favored-nation treatment; and 
as to taxes, charges, and imports, direct or indirect, touching 
the property rights or interests of nationals or companies of 
such powers or restrictions, the treatment must be that accorded 
to German nationals. In all the foregoing I do not recall one 
reciprocal favor granted to Germany or her nationals. 

The general principle of favored-nation treatment, and in 
some cases national treatment, is granted to the allied and asso- 
ciated countries and their nationals in all matters referring to 
transit, which Germany must expedite over and through Ger- 
man territory, and as to all charges connected therewith, all 
without any reciprocal undertaking in favor of Germany. All 
regulations governing such traffic must be equal and nondis- 
criminating as against the allied or associated powers or tbeir 
nationals. Moreover, all inland traffic, our " coastwise " trade, 
is open to the vessels of the allied and associated powers on the 
same terms as German vessels, while Germany may not engage 
without permission in the like traffic of any other power. 

Existing free zones in ports shall be maintained, and, in 
addition, Germany shall lease to Czechoslovakia areas in Ham- 
burg and Stettin, which shall be placed under the regime of free 
zones. 

Certain specified areas of the great German river systems of 
the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and additional parts of the 
Danube, and all navigable parts of these river systems, are 
internationalized and placed under the administration of inter- 
national commissions. The internationalization of the Rhine 
is extended. On these the traffic is open to the vessels of all 
nations on terms of perfect equality. Special concessions are 
given to France and Belgium on the Ehine, which need not be 
further noted. 

Finally, Germany undertakes so to adapt her railway rolling 
stock that it may accommodate the inclusion in German trains 
134768—19802 



31 

of the rolling stock of the allied and associated powers, and 
that the trains of the latter may incorporate German rolling 
stock. In addition to this, regulations are laid down as to rates 
and traffic on through trains, which Germany undertakes to 
accept and operate. 

These are broad statements, covering an almost infinity of 
details on these various subjects. For no one of these various 
trade concessions and agreements is Germany given any credit 
or compensation nor any direct or conspicuous advantage named 
in the treaty. 

In addition to all this, she waives all claims arising out of 
the internment or repatriation of German nationals and all 
claims arising out of the capture and condemnation of German 
ships or the liquidation of German property in China and Siam. 
Germany waives to all of the allied and associated powers and 
their nationals — as already noted — all claims of any descrip- 
tion in respect to the detention, employment (except under the 
armistice terms), loss or damage of any German ships or boats, 
and all claims to vessels or cargoes sunk by or in consequence 
of naval action and subsequently salved, in which any of the 
allied or associated Governments or their nationals may have 
any interest either as owner, charterer, insurer, or otherwise, 
notwithstanding any decree or condemnation by a German prize 
court. Finally, Germany undertakes not to put forward, directly 
or indirectly, against any allied or associated power signatory 
of the present treaty, including those which without having 
declared war have broken off: diplomatic relations with the 
German Empire, any pecuniary claim based on events which 
occurred at any time before the coming into force of the present 
treaty, such claims by this provision to be finally and completely 
barred. 

And as a capstone to this whole remarkable edifice let me 
refer to that provision by which Germany, on the one hand, 
accepts and agrees to be bound by all decrees and orders con- 
cerning German ships and goods made by any prize court of the 
allied and associated powers and agrees to put forward no 
claim arising out of such orders and decrees, and on the other 

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32 

hand acknowledges the right of the allied and associated powers 
to challenge all German prize-court decisions and orders. 

As to that part of the treaty which deals with labor, I shall 
now merely say : Either it will never be enforced as drawn, and 
perhaps was never intended to be enforced as drawn, but to be 
merely a sop thrown to labor, or if enforced as written and in the 
spirit its provisions seem to carry it will wreck the world. It 
compels the class antagonism between capital and labor which 
wisdom requires that we lessen, not increase, if we are to re- 
main a free people ; and makes possible an ultimate interference 
of foreign nations in our labor disputes at the instance of resi- 
dents of our own country. 

I regret, sir, that this has been a long and tedious process, 
but its importance could be satisfied in no other way. It has 
shown us the treaty takes Germany's territory, European and 
foreign, without compensation ; that it takes from her practi- 
cally all of her ocean shipping and a large portion of her inland 
vessels ; that it deprives her of all special benefits of treaties 
and conventions ; that it takes her cables ; that it compels her 
to supply large quantities of raw materials ; that it internation- 
alizes her great river system and throws them open to traffic 
of all nations on a national basis as if they were the high seas ; 
that it opens her coastwise shipping to all nations ; that it com- 
pels her to grant exceptional import and export privileges and 
to accept important restrictions ; that it lays down far-reaching 
principles governing her internal commerce and transportation ; 
that it closes out German interests in practically the whole 
civilized world — outside the territories of her late allies — in- 
cluding those areas which have been taken from her and given 
to others ; that it closes out the interests of that same world in 
Germany. It has shown that having done all this it assesses 
against her provisionally, with a stipulation permitting an in- 
crease, a debt of 120,000,000,000 gold marks, which is in addi- 
tion to the property restored in kind, and to the value of the 
boats, gold, and securities delivered ; that it makes her responsi- 
ble for these damages inflicted not only by herself but by her 
allies, and even by the allied and associated powers themselves, 

134768—19802 



with a list of items which includes some admittedly contrary 
to the rules of international law hitherto existing and that 
finally and in addition she is compelled to answer to her own 
nationals for the value of the property taken by the allied and 
associated powers. 

It- remains for me to add that the United States is bound up 
in every one of the obligations and duties incident to the en- 
forcement of these terms, with the great responsibilities attached 
thereto. 

We are participants, either as one of the principal allied and 
associated powers, or as a member of the council of the league 
of nations, in the Belgian, Saar Basin, Czecho-Slovak State, 
Polish, free city of Danzig, and Schleswig boundary commis- 
sions. We are in like manner participants in the Saar Basin 
governing commission, with all the inevitable difficulties and 
dangers attached thereto. We participate in plebiscite commis- 
sions of Poland, Schleswig, and East Prussia, and the interallied 
military, naval, and aeronautical commissions of control charged 
with enforcing the disarmament provisions of this treaty. In 
addition we have our own prisoners and graves commissions, 
our own clearing offices if we adopt that method of adjusting 
the enumerated debts. Finally, we are one of the four powers 
whose representatives are to sit as a reparation commission to 
assess damages against Germany, to appraise credits, to judge 
of her economic requirements as affecting her ability to furnish 
certain raw materials, to pass on her tax system, to postpone 
payment on her debts, to prescribe the conditions of her bonds, 
to recommend abatement of her debt, to appraise the value of 
public property in ceded territories, and a great bulk of other 
duties that need not be here referred to, all of which may make 
or break the peace of Europe, with an obligation on our part 
that having so participated in the breaking we shall once more 
contribute our millions of men and our billions of dollars to the 
readjustments. 

In addition to this, the United States is to appoint arbitrators 
to determine the amount of river craft that shall go to France 
on the Rhine and to the allied and associated powers— includ- 

134768—19802 



34 

Ing ourselves— on the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and the 
Danube, and to determine the conditions under which the in- 
ternational convention relative to the St. Gothard Railway may 
me denounced. 

Mr. President, the more I consider this treaty the more I am 
convinced that the only safe way for us to deal with it is to 
decline to be a party to it at all. I think we should renounce 
in favor of Germany any and all claims for indemnity because 
of the Avar and see that she gets credit for what we renounce, as 
indeed she should for the value of all she gives up as against a 
fixed and ample indemnity. I agree with the President when he 
says the indemnity should have been a fixed amount. We ought 
to renounce all participation or membership in commissions, 
committees, boards, or otherwise provided for in the treaty in 
aid of its execution to which by its terms we are parties. We 
ought not to accept cessions of German territory. We ought to 
declare a general policy to regard with concern any threat of 
disturbance of general world peace, but at the same time we 
shoidd reserve complete liberty of action either independently or 
in conjunction with other powers in taking such steps as we 
determine wise for preserving the peace. We ought, then, to 
carry out the spirit of the act of 1916, which authorized the 
President to convene the nations of the world together to estab- 
lish a code of international law, reduce armaments, to establish 
an international tribunal and go as far as possible in the direc- 
tion of securing peace through justice, through a league to which 
all the world are parties in its formation. This would be a fit- 
ting, generous, and dignified exit from a situation in which pri- 
marily we had no direct concern. 

It is indeed a hard and cruel peace that this treaty stipulates, 
and I have no objections to its being so, but see no reason why 
we, who do not partake in its spoils, should become parties to 
its harshness and cruelty. I see no reason why we should be 
parties to imposing upon Germany a treaty whose terms, our 
negotiators say, she will not be able to meet ; a treaty that robs 
©or ancient friend, China, in a way disapproved by our negotia- 
tors; a treaty that lays the foundation for centuries of blood- 

134768—19802 



35 

letting, into which we should not be drawn ; a treaty that, con- 
trary to our own judgment, fails to fix the amount of indemnity 
to be paid, leaving that vast question to the whim of a majority 
of a commission on reparations; a treaty predicated upon the 
assertion that a stricken and helpless world requires our coun- 
sel and support but leaves to the beneficiaries the decision as to 
the measure and character of the benefactions they are to re- 
ceive; a treaty that with ominous words presages our involve- 
ment in the eruptions of suppressed volcanic world conditions; a 
treaty that would require us to underwrite all the regional under- 
standings between nations recognized by the league, most of 
which are based upon oppression of weaker nations, many of 
which are as yet secret and undisclosed, and when disclosed 
might drive us to acts of injustice similar to that in which the 
President felt himself compelled to acquiesce in the case of 
Shantung. 

The mind stands appalled and refuses to grasp the infinite 
possibilities which arise from the ramifications of the obligations 
we are asked to assume. Looking at the treaty as a whole, is it 
to be wondered at that we are asked to guarantee by our arms 
and our resources the territorial status which it creates? 

Sir, I have all but finished. I have not sought to propound 
or establish any thesis beyond this : The treaty as it stands 
can not be enforced. This is admitted by its proponents. The 
treaty as it stands is but a harbinger of other and greater wars. 
This being true, the question must come, Why was this treaty so 
drawn and the vanquished compelled to sign it? It may be 
when we get all the documents this will appear. And yet in 
spite of all these great duties and obligations we assume for the 
future, in spite of our great contribution in men and resources 
to the successful fruition of the great joint enterprise we entered, 
it seems to be proposed that we are to waive all participation 
in the benefits of this treaty, and that we are to add further to 
the general burdens of the people by ourselves compensating our 
citizens who have suffered losses in this war. 

The weight of the task resting upon us is not light, but the 
people demand that we fully perform it, in accordance with our 
sworn duty. We can in this matter take the ipse dixit of no man. 
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36 



I have sought in my remarks to put before the people as. tersely: 
as I could the salient features of this treaty so that, knowing 
them, their counsel might assist us in our work. For one of the 
great defects thus far incident to the treaty is that too few 
minds have functioned on its provisions, and perusing it one 
finds it impossible to believe that any responsible mind had 
sought to coordinate its provisions and trace out their ultimate 
logical conclusions. 

Nothing in all our history, sir, has called for a clearer per- 
ception of present and future, a keener or juster understanding 
of our free institutions, a clearer vision of the. mighty mission: 
of our great Nation in the world, or the dedication of a purer 
and loftier patriotism than the consideration of this treaty. 

Unless, sir, we shall have the guidance of the infinite wisdom 
we shall fail in our duty, and, wrecking our beloved country, 
earn the odium of its treasonable betrayal. [Applause in the 
galleries.] 

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